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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to investigate the busyness of audit committee and its 
relationship with financial reporting quality. Increasing corporate governance reforms 
have made the responsibilities of audit committee more onerous; therefore, there is now 
widespread concern whether busy audit committees can carry out their monitoring 
duties effectively. To address the concern with audit committee busyness in an emerging 
economy like Malaysia, the study, which is drawn from the agency and resource 
dependence theories, examines if there is any relationship between audit committee 
busyness and financial reporting quality. The samples in this study comprise the top 150 
listed companies in Malaysia, where audit committee busyness is analysed from the 
perspective of multiple directorships and overlapping board committees, using audit 
delay and financial restatements as proxies to financial reporting quality. It is observed 
that financial experts on the audit committee are busier than non-financial experts in 
terms of multiple directorships. Similarly, the audit committee chair has significantly 
higher multiple directorships than non-chair members. Findings fiom the study reveal 
that the presence of an audit committee financial expert in the remuneration committee 
is an important determinant to reduce audit delay. The relationship between multiple 
directorships of audit committee and audit report delay is also found to be statistically 
significant. Further evidence suggests that companies whose audit committee chair has 
overlapping membership, are more likely to restate their financial statement. Findings 
fiom this study also indicate that the overlapping committee membership of audit 
committee financial experts is significantly and negatively related to financial 
restatement. Findings from this study provide additional knowledge by suggesting that 
the board needs to examine the busyness of the audit committee chair and financial 
experts separately to improve the company's financial reporting quality. This would be 
relevant to policy-makers in evaluating the merits of regulating multiple directorships. 
Keywords : multiple directorships, overlapping board committees, audit delays, 
restatements, financial reporting quality 
ABSTRAK 
Matlamat kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji hubungan antara kesibukan jawatankuasa 
audit dengan kualiti laporan kewangan. Pelbagai peningkatan dalam pembaharuan tadbir 
urus korporat telah menj adikan tanggungjawab j awatankuasa audit semakin 
membebankan. Justeru itu, ia menyebabkan kebimbangan yang tinggi sama ada 
jawantankuasa audit yang sibuk boleh menjalankan tugas pemantauan secara berkesan 
ataupun tidak. Untuk menangani kebimbangan isu kesibukan jawatankuasa audit dalam 
konteks ekonomi yang pesat membangun seperti Malaysia, kajian yang berdasarkan 
teori agensi dan teori bergantungan sumber ini telah memeriksa hubungan antara 
kesibukan jawatankuasa audit dengan laporan kewangan berkualiti. Kaj ian ini 
menggunakan sebanyak 150 sampel yang terdiri daripada syarikat besar di Bursa 
Malaysia. Kesibukan jawatankuasa audit dikaji dari segi pengarahan berbilang dan 
lembaga jawatankuasa bertindih dengan menggunakan kelewatan audit dan penyataan 
semula laporan kewangan sebagai proksi kepada kualiti laporan kewangan. Keputusan 
kajian telah menunjukkan bahawa pakar kewangan jawatankuasa audit adalah lebih 
sibuk daripada bukan-pakar kewangan jawatankuasa audit dari segi pengarahan 
berbilang. Begitu juga pengerusi jawatankuasa audit mernpunyai lebih banyak 
pengarahan berbilang berbanding dengan bukan-pengerusi jawatankuasa audit. 
Keputusan kajian juga menunjukkan kehadiran pakar kewangan jawatankuasa audit 
dalam jawatankuasa imbuhan adalah penentu yang penting untuk mengurangkan 
kelewatan laporan audit. Hubungan antara pengarahan berbilang dalam kalangan ahli 
jawatankuasa audit adalah berhubungan secara signifikan dengan kelewatan laporan 
audit. Kajian ini juga telah membuktikan bahawa lembaga jawatankuasa bertindih bagi 
pengerusi jawatankuasa audit adalah lebih cenderung untuk menyatakan semula laporan 
kewangan. Walau bagaimanapun, lembaga jawatankuasa bertindih bagi pakar kewangan 
jawatankuasa audit adalah berhubungan secara signifikan dan negatif dengan penyataan 
semula laporan kewangan. Keputusan daripada kajian ini memberi maklumat tambahan 
dengan mencadangkan agar lembaga pengarah perlu meneliti kesibukan pengerusi dan 
pakar kewangan jawatankuasa audit secara berasingan. Kajian ini adalah relevan kepada 
penggubal dasar dalam menilai merit mengawal selia pengarahan berbilang. 
Kata kunci : pengarahan berbilang, lembaga jawatankuasa bertindih, kelewatan audit, 
penyataan semula laporan kewangan, kualiti laporan kewangan 
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The chapter is the introductory chapter for this study. This chapter comprises the 
background of the study, followed by the problem statements, audit committee 
busyness, research motivation and objectives as well as the research questions of the 
study. Further, the chapter discusses the uniqueness of the study, followed by the 
significance and scope of the study. Finally, the chapter highlights the organisation of 
the dissertation and summary. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Audit committee is not a new concept in developing countries, like Malaysia. In 
Malaysia, all listed companies have been mandated to establish an audit committee since 
1 August, 1994 under section 15A of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (now known as 
Bursa Malaysia) Listing Requirements (Rahman and Salim, 2009). Various measures 
have been undertaken by the regulators to improve audit committee effectiveness as part 
of a strong corporate governance structure. For example, in 2007, the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance was revised with additional requirements, that in the audit 
committee must consist of at least three directors, with the majority comprising 
independent non-executive directors and the chairman has to be an independent non- 
executive director with no alternate director allowed. These requirements have been 
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